KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE's CONTRIBUTION TO AUSTRALIAN HISTORY: AN EVALUATION

In two recent books, Keith Windschuttle has reinvigorated debate on two central questions in Australian history: the extent of frontier violence in the colonisation of Australia and the origins of the White Australia Policy. This assessment of Windschuttle's scholarship will focus on how he arrives at his conclusions: his methodology, his use of evidence and the coherence of his arguments. It will draw on the literature of economic history to show how its methods and perspectives can inform these debates in Australian history.     

Rent extraction,principal–agent relationships,and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta

Two‐part pricing, price‐discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal–agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor‐license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal–agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

U.S. Corporate Governance: Accomplishments and Failings A Discussion with Michael Jensen and Robert Monks

Two of America's most prominent shareholder activists discuss three major issues surrounding the U.S. corporate governance system: (1) the case for increasing shareholder “democracy” by expanding investor access to the corporate proxy; (2) lessons for public companies in the success of private equity; and (3) the current level and design of CEO pay. On the first of the three subjects, Robert Monks suggests that the U.S. should adopt the British convention of the “extraordinary general meeting,” or “EGM,” which gives a majority of shareholders who attend the meeting the right to remove any or all of a company's directors “with or without cause.” Such shareholder meetings are permitted in virtually all developed economies outside the U.S. because, as Monks goes on to say, they represent “a far more efficient and effective solution than the idea of having shareholders nominate people for the simple reason that even very involved, financially sophisticated fiduciaries are not the best people to nominate directors.” Moreover, according to both Jensen and Monks, corporate boards in the U.K. do a better job than their U.S. counterparts of monitoring top management on behalf of shareholders. In contrast to the U.S., where the majority of companies continue to be run by CEO/Chairmen, over 90% of English companies are now chaired by outside directors, contributing to “a culture of independent‐minded chairmen capable of providing a high level of oversight.” In the U.S., by contrast, most corporate directors continue to view themselves as “employees of the CEO.” And, as a result, U.S. boards generally fail to exercise effective oversight and control until outside forces—often in the form of activist investors such as hedge funds and private equity—bring about a “crisis.” In companies owned and run by private equity firms, by contrast, top management is vigorously monitored and controlled by a board made up of the firm's largest investors. And the fact that the rewards to the operating heads of successful private equity‐controlled firms are typically multiples of those received by comparably effective public company CEOs suggests that the problem with U.S. CEO pay is not its level, but its lack of correlation with performance.     

Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs

This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.     

How efficient are national environmental standards? A benefit-cost analysis of the United States experience

This paper summarizes the results of the first systematic, geographically-specific efficiency assessment of the U.S. experience with national environmental standards and with alternative approaches to establishing those standards. This ex-post evaluation assessed the net benefits that resulted from EPA's regulation of conventional air and water pollutants from the pulp and paper industry between 1973 and 1984. The paper compares the benefit-cost efficiencies of the three dominant regulatory approaches: technology, ambient, and benefits. Unlike previous studies, which assessed benefits and costs on a national basis, the study estimates both costs and benefits on a facility-by-facility basis. The analysis shows how the efficiency of national environmental regulations can vary dramatically at local levels. The authors conclude that the technology-based standards for water pollution management failed as an efficient environmental strategy. The costs clearly exceeded the benefits in the aggregate, as well as in the specific in most situations. Benefits exceeded costs at only 11 of the 68 mills investigated. The ambient based standards for air pollution management succeeded as an environmental strategy in the aggregate, but succeeded in the specific for only one-third of the mills (22 of 60 mills). The benefits-based standards for air pollution management also succeeded in the aggregate as well as in the specific for about one-half of the mills. Benefits exceeded costs at 29 of the 60 mills investigated. The results of the study point to two major conclusions. First, a regulatory policy that is based on some measure of environmental results, either ambient-based or benefits-based, will be more efficient than a policy that ignores environmental results. Second, truly efficient policies for reducing environmental risks require pollution mitigation decisions that take into account local conditions. These include not only the changes in local ambient conditions, but also the number of people who will benefit from pollution reduction decisions. This latter conclusion suggests that national environmental standards per se may be inefficient.Dr. Luken is currently Senior Environmental Advisor to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna, Austria. He is on leave from the U.S. EPA where he was Chief of the Economic Analysis and Research Branch of the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE). Mr. Clark is President of Environmental Economics Associates of Traverse City, Michigan. He was formerly Chief of EPA's Cost and Economic Impact Analysis Branch in OPPE. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.     

Die Erwartungen der Wirtschaft für 2016

Last year saw only a moderate economic upturn, which will continue in 2016. Geopolitical risks and the loss of momentum in the emerging economies are obstacles that may hinder a positive trend in exports. However, the falling crude oil price and the low euro currency rate give hope for better prospects. On the domestic front, there is a strong focus on the digitisation of all sectors. Meanwhile, many problems result from the low level of investments and the high energy costs resulting from the energy transition. The insurance industry views the low-yield environment, which greatly intensified last year, as its main challenge in 2016.